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Abstract 
After the presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, which according to the official data, 
was won by the then President Alexander Lukashenko, mass protests against falsifications began 
in the country. Believers of various denominations joined these actions. Therefore, the 
leadership of the country’s religious organizations were faced with the question of determining 
their attitude toward these actions. The leadership of the largest religious organization in 
Belarus, the Belarusian Orthodox Church, initially expressed some dissatisfaction with the 
authorities’ violence. The then exarch of this church, Pavlo, despite congratulating Lukashenko 
on his election victory, still expressed some sympathy to the protesters. However, after the 
change of the head of this church, which was carried out on August 25 by the Synod of the 
Russian Orthodox Church (part of which is the Belarusian Orthodox Church), the situation 
changed. The new exarch of Belarus, Benjamin, met with Lukashenko and showed a positive 
attitude towards his regime, although many Orthodox believers and even the priesthood 
supported the protesters. However, the leadership of the Catholic Church in Belarus condemned 
the violence of the authorities, upon which the authorities started putting pressure on the Catholic 
Church.  They have isolated its head, Metropolitan Tadevush Kandrusevich, by not allowing 
him to re-enter the territory of the Republic of Belarus. As for Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Old 
Believers, and other religious organizations that do not have much influence in Belarusian 
society, their leaders try to distance themselves from political issues without explicitly 
supporting either side. However, some members of these denominations, including clergy, 
participated in the protests. 
 
Keywords: Alexander Lukashenko, protests, Belarusian Orthodox Church, Exarch of Belarus, 
Catholic Church in Belarus, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Old Believers. 
 
Introduction 
On August 9, 2020, the sixth presidential election took place in Belarus. 
According to the official data, Alexander Lukashenko became the winner for the sixth 
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time.1 He has held the presidency since 1994. The announcement of the results of the 
election on August 9, 2020, provoked mass protests in contrast to the situation in the 
previous presidential election, despite repression by the security forces. 
Many Belarusians actively oppose Lukashenko’s regime. The Belarusian 
religious organizations have to make a choice whether they are on the side of the current 
government or on the side of the protesters who have mass support in the Belarusian 
society. The difficulty of this choice is due to the fact that Lukashenko is not willing to 
give up his position. Despite the odious course of the election campaign and the mass 
protests caused by the falsification of its results,2 on September 23, 2020, his 
inauguration took place in a closed ceremony.3 Lukashenko controls the administrat ive 
apparatus he has formed during his tenure in power, the security forces and the army, 
which generally show loyalty to him. 
The activity of the religious organizations in Belarus under such circumstances 
is of interest to political scientists and religious scholars. There are studies that deal with 
this issue. In particular, this applies to the analytical articles of Archimandrite Kirill 
(Govorun)4 and Tatiana Derkatch,5 which mainly deal with the attitude of the Belarusian 
Orthodox Church toward the protests. In general, this issue needs a comprehensive 
consideration of the activities of both the Orthodox and other denominations, includ ing 
Catholics. 
Opposition to Lukashenko’s regime poses significant risks to the religious 
organizations. By taking the side of the protesters, they can be subjected to oppression 
and repression. This is happening now, as some priests who have supported the 
protesters are under pressure from the authorities. The biggest religious organization in 
the country, the Belarusian Orthodox Church (which is closely associated with the 
                                                                 
1 “Заседание Центральной комиссии. Центральная комиссия Республики Беларусь по выборам и 
проведению республиканских референдумов.” http://www.rec.gov.by/ru/novosti/14-08-2020-
zasedanie-centralnoy-komissii. Accessed 15/11/2020.   
2 “Доклад докладчика ОБСЕ в рамках Московского механизма в связи с сообщениями о 
нарушениях прав человека в контексте президентских выборов 9 августа 2020 г. в Беларуси.”  
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europе. https://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/46954.  Accessed 
15/11/2020.  
3 “Инаугурация Лукашенко на закрытой церемонии. Фоторепортаж.” 
https://www.rbc.ru/photoreport/23/09/2020/5f6b0fee9a7947cb350ed6cc.  Accessed 15/11/2020.  
4 Кирилл Говорун. “Простесты в Беларуси и Православная церковь.” Public Orthodoxy. 
https://publicorthodoxy.org/ru/2020/08/20/7351/.   Accessed 15/11/2020. 
5 Татьяна Деркач. “Судьба президента. Чем аукнется Белорусской церкви верность Лукашенко.” 
Credo.press. 
https://credo.press/232755/?fbclid=IwAR0XvBiHNQeGuY8132qxM4KuNKQEKgfKC_aVYEM6Da6R
kok7ZWeRLavIPrI.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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authorities), is particularly at risk. However, support for Lukashenko’s regime and 
distancing from the protesters can also have negative consequences for the religious 
organizations. Among the believers there are large numbers of people who either take 
an active part in the protests or morally support them. To turn away from them is to lose 
the congregation. Finding the “golden mean” in this situation is quite problematic. 
The position of the country’s religious organizations in relation to the protests 
depends on a number of factors—such as the level of their independence, integrat ion 
into the government structures, ties with foreign religious centers, and the extent to 
which the leaders and priesthood of these organizations consider the point of view of the 
congregation. 
Before speaking about the role of the religious factor in the current politica l 
events in Belarus, it should be taken into consideration that the level of religiosity in 
Belarus is not high. During the Soviet times, particularly in 1987, only 15% of the 
population of the then Republic of Belarus considered themselves believers. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union when Belarus became independent, this number grew 
significantly. Half, or even more than half, of the country’s population considers 
themselves believers. However, they are not active.6 Among them, about three-quarters 
are Orthodox, of which the religiosity of most is reduced to occasional visits to churches 
and participation in rites. According to the official data of the Commissioner for 
Religions and Nationalities of the Republic of Belarus, as of January 1, 2020, there are 
25 denominations in the country with 3,389 religious communities and 2,725 
functioning places of worship7—which is not much for a country of 9.4 million people. 
In general, Belarus is one of the least religious countries in the world.8 However, the 
role of the religious factor in the social life of Belarus should not be underestimated. At 




                                                                 
6 “Почти половина населения Белоруссии – верующие.”  NEWSru. https://www.newsru. 
com/religy/09jul2001/ 
verobel.html.   Accessed 15/11/2020. 
7 “Информация о кофессиональной ситуации в Республике Беларусь.” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/1439296790.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
8 What Alabamians and Iranians Have in Common . https://news.gallup.com/poll/114211/Alabamians -
Iranians-Common.aspx.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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The Belarusian Orthodox Church: from “Soft Opposition” to Loyalty 
It is difficult to classify Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus for more than 26 
years as a believer. He has essentially identified himself as an “Orthodox atheist,”9 
which looks strange at first glance. After all, it would seem that the Orthodox faith 
should not be combined with atheism. However, such “Orthodox atheism” was 
characteristic of many Soviet people, including the members of the nomenclature (high-
ranking functionaries), to which Lukashenko belonged. As a rule, such people did not 
care about religious issues and did not consider themselves as believers. Nevertheless, 
many of them were brought up within the Orthodox tradition. They showed a certain 
tolerance of it and even participated in some Orthodox rites. Despite the fact that 
Lukashenko tries to preserve and even cultivate the Soviet traditions and stereotypes, he 
is forced to turn his attention to a “religious revival” in modern Belarus. Lukashenko 
approaches religious structures quite pragmatically, realizing that they are able to 
influence and control people. In this regard, the religious organizations are of interest to 
the Belarusian leader because they can help him maintain power. Therefore, he is ready 
to demonstrate non-confessionalism. He also shows a willingness to cooperate with the 
religious organizations, even to help them, trying to integrate them into the government 
agencies. 
This is especially true of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, the country’s largest 
religious organization, which is part of the Russian Orthodox Church as an exarchate. 
In fact, this religious organization is often referred to in official documents as the 
Belarusian Exarchate, which has existed since 1989. It currently includes 15 eparchies. 
As of January 1, 2020, the Belarusian Orthodox Church had 1,709 parishes and 35 
monasteries. It owned 1,683 churches, and 190 more were built later.10 Training of 
Orthodox priesthood in Belarus is carried out both in confessional educational 
institutions (Minsk Theological Academy, two theological seminaries, and four 
theological schools) and in a secular educational institution (the Belarusian State 
University, which has an institute of theology).11 Training of priesthood at the state 
                                                                 
9 “ ‘Дни рождения я вообще не отмечаю. Это для меня самый паршивый день в жизни’ : президент 
Беларуси – обо всем.”  RTVi. https://rtvi.com/stories/dni-rozhdeniya-ya-voobshche-ne-otmechayu/. 
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
10 “Информация о кофессиональной ситуации в Республике Беларусь.” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/1439296790.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
11 “Белорусский Экзархат: структура.” Официальный портал Белорусской Православной Церкви. 
http://www.church.by/belorusskiy-ekzarhat/. Accessed 15/11/2020.  
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university is unique. Such institutions are controlled by the authorities and, accordingly, 
the students are brought up in the spirit of loyalty to the existing regime. 
One can talk about a “double loyalty” of the Belarusian Exarchate. On the one 
hand, this religious structure, being part of the Russian Orthodox Church, is loyal to the 
current Russian government which works closely with this church. It is noteworthy that 
the first two Belarusian exarchs appointed by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Filaret (Kirill Varfolomeyevich Vakhromeev) and Paul (George Vasilevich 
Ponomaryov), were ethnic Russians who had been clergy in Russia for a long time 
before appearing in Belarus. On December 25, 2013, Paul’s appointment as 
Metropolitan of Minsk and Slutsk and, accordingly, Patriarchal Exarch of All Belarus 
provoked a negative reaction among public activists. After all, this hierarch did not have 
Belarusian citizenship but continued to retain Russian citizenship, and he could not 
speak the Belarusian language. He openly opposed the creation of a national Belarusian 
church, considering the case as a “temptation of the devil.”12 In his person, the Orthodox 
believers of Belarus acquired a typical follower of the “Russkiy mir” [Russian world.] 
On the other hand, the Belarusian exarchate has shown and continues to show 
loyalty to the current regime—to Lukashenko’s regime. Moreover, the latter provides 
some assistance to this religious organization, including some terms of doing business. 
The enterprises associated with the exarchate are the supply of alcohol, ownership of 
cafes and hotels, medical services, publishing houses, and so on. Exarch Paul even 
advocated that “profitable houses” be built near the temples (cafeterias, hotels, shops, 
and other commercial structures that would make a profit), out of which the church 
premises would be maintained.13 The close relationship between the state bodies and the 
Belarusian Exarchate is enshrined in the relevant document, the Agreement on 
Cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Belarusian Orthodox Church, 
which was signed in 2003.14 
Lukashenko is even inclined to view the Belarusian Orthodox Church as “the 
country’s main idea-monger.” In particular, he stated this on January 7, 2008, during a 
                                                                 
12 “Митрополит Павел против создания национальной белорусской церкви, он сравнил эту идею с 
искушением дьавола.” Наша Ніва. https://nashaniva.by/?c=ar&i=183139&lang=ru.  Accessed 
15/11/2020. 
13 “Митрополит Павел хочет занятся строительством доходных домов в Беларуси.” 
Недвижимость. TUN.BY. https://realty.tut.by/news/money/488628.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
14 “Информация о кофессиональной ситуации в Республике Беларусь.” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/1439296790.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2020) XL, 10 31
visit to the Holy Spirit Cathedral in Minsk. Then he said: “We have never separated 
ourselves from the Church. And I, sinfully, sometimes told my mentor that I did not 
quite understand what it meant to separate the Church from the state. After all, we are 
solving a common problem. We have never denied the thesis of the separation of church 
and state, but you see that we are always together.” At the same time, Lukashenko 
claimed that he would rely on other “good denominations,” in particular, Catholics. 15 
These statements reveal the religious pragmatism of the Belarusian leader, who is 
willing to cooperate with “good denominations,” especially with the Orthodox believers. 
Lukashenko divides denominations into “good” and “bad.” The “bad ones” are, 
in fact, banned. These include the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. This 
religious organization was mainly formed during the Second World War, when the 
Belarusian lands came under German occupation. In the postwar period, this church 
continued its activities in the Diaspora, particularly in the United States. In the 1980s it 
split.16 After 1991, there were attempts to resume the activities of this church in Belarus. 
However, they did not succeed because it turned out to be unnecessary for Lukashenko. 
Firstly, it was divided and did not receive the canonical recognition from other Orthodox 
churches. Secondly, this church had a Belarusian national orientation and was an 
undesirable competitor for the Belarusian Exarchate, which had the pro-Russian 
orientation. 
The “double loyalty” of the Belarusian Exarchate (in fact, to the Russian and 
Belarusian authorities) is not contradictory. Despite some conflicts with Moscow, 
Lukashenko still pursues a pro-Russian course, although some of his steps caused alarm 
on the part of Russian hierarchs. Thus, in October 2010, Lukashenko met with 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul during his visit to Turkey. There were 
reports in the media that he was discussing with that hierarch the issue of granting 
autocephaly to the Belarusian Orthodox Church.17 Of course, doing so in Belarus is very 
problematic.  Lukashenko needed a meeting with the Ecumenical Patriarch, rather, as a 
kind of blackmail of the Russian leadership, with which the President of Belarus then 
                                                                 
15 “Белорусскую православную церковь Лукашенко назвал главным идеологом страны.” 
NEWSru.com. https://www.newsru.com/religy/08jan2008/luka shenko.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
16 Н. Гардзіенка,  Л. Юрэвіч.  Рада БНР. 1982-1997. Падзеі, дакументы, асобы. (Мінск: 
Кнігазбор, 2015), 6-11. 
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had conflicts. As if to say, if you do not make concessions to me, I will liquidate “your 
church” in Belarus. The meeting, as well as some of Lukashenko’s curtseys toward the 
Catholics who have become a “good denomination” for him, show that he is willing to 
play his game in the religious field—which may or may not be liked by the leaders of 
Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. And here some disagreements with the 
Belarusian Exarchate are quite possible. 
Such inconsistencies became apparent after the presidential election in Belarus 
in August 2020, when mass protests began in the country. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin was one of the first to congratulate Lukashenko on his victory, which was also 
done by Moscow Patriarch Kirill. It is natural that the Belarusian Exarch Paul joined 
these congratulations. This happened on August 10. Already on August 12, when a wave 
of protests and mass detentions of protesters began in Belarus, Exarch Paul held a press 
conference calling for “an end to hostility and hatred,” and “to preserve peace and 
unanimity.”18 On August 14, Paul apologized for congratulating Lukashenko. A 
spokesman for the Belarusian Exarchate, Archpriest Serhiy Lepin said: “The 
Metropolitan received information about the events in Belarus, he saw a video of the 
detentions, he was indignant, terrified and agitated.”19 The spokesman also said that 
prayers in support of the detainees would be held in Orthodox churches. Such a 
statement by the press service of the Belarusian Exarchate was a challenge to 
Lukashenko’s government. 
On August 15, the Synod of the Belarusian Exarchate issued an “Appeal to the 
people of the Republic of Belarus to end the people’s confrontation.” In particular, it 
said: “Strongly condemning violence, torture, humiliation, unjustified detentions, 
extremism in all its forms and manifestations, lies and treachery, we call on all those for 
whom our Motherland is dear, children, relatives and friends—stop and put an end to 
the confrontation.”20 In general, the leadership of the Belarusian Exarchate called for 
reconciliation. Instead, some Orthodox priests supported the protests in one form or 
another. On August 13, prayers and processions began in Minsk to support the 
                                                                 
18 “Митрополит Павел: Давайте вместе остановим вражду и ненависть.” Официальный портал 
Белорусской Православной Церкви. http://www.church.by/news/day/12-08-2020/.  Accessed 
15/11/2020. 
19 “Предстоятель Белорусской церкви извинился за поздравление Лукашенко с победой.” Радио 
Свобода. https://www.svoboda.org/a/30784028.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
20 “Обращение Синода Белорусской Православной Церкви к народу Республики Беларусь о 
прекращении народного противостояния.” Русская православна церковь. Официальній сайт 
Московского патриархата. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5677056.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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protesters. The organizers of these actions were young Orthodox laity, who were also 
joined by representatives of other denominations. Exarch Paul took part in them. He 
even visited in the hospital those protesters who suffered at the hands of security 
forces.21 
Some Orthodox priests spoke in support of the protesters. In particular, that 
concerned Archbishop of Grodno and Vaukavysk Artemy. On August 14, he published 
his appeal to the flock, condemning the government’s actions. It said: “Eternal memory 
to the dead and consolation to their relatives and friends! A speedy recovery to all those 
who had suffered and freedom to those who are still waiting for it! And let all the facts 
of deception, violence and cruelty be investigated fairly, honestly and openly, so that 
Justice may be done and the truth may prevail!”22 In principle, it is not surprising that 
the Archbishop of Grodno did it. The Grodno region is the western part of Belarus, 
which until 1939 was a part of interwar Poland. Western influences are noticeable here. 
Many people in the region have ties to the European Union, especially Poland and 
Lithuania, which condemned Lukashenko’s regime for rigging the 2020 presidentia l 
election. Archbishop Artemy defended his doctoral dissertation in theology in Poland at 
the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw.23 In addition, the level of Belarusian 
national consciousness in the Grodno region is relatively high compared to other regions 
of Belarus. This makes the region one of the most “oppositional” to Lukashenko’s 
regime. Furthermore, there is a noticeable influence of Catholics in the region, who from 
the very beginning condemned the falsifications in the presidential election in Belarus 
in 2020. Therefore, many representatives of the local Orthodox clergy supported the 
protesters. 
It is not for nothing that Lukashenko came to Grodno specifically for the pro-
government rally on August 22, where he said the following: “I am surprised by the 
position of our denominations. People should come to the churches to pray! Churches 
and cathedrals are not for politics.” At the same time, he actually threatened the clergy: 
                                                                 
21 О. Вагнер. “‘Власть показала сатанинское лицо.’ Церковь и белорусские протесты.”  Радио 
Свобода. https://www.svoboda.org/a/30792357.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
22 “Обращение архиепископа Гродненского и Волковысского Артемия к клиру и пастве 
Гродненской епархии.” Гродненская епархия. Белорусская православная церковь. 
https://www.orthos.org/eparhiya/bishop/speech/2020/08/14/obrashchenie-arhiepiskopa-grodnenskogo-
volkovysskogo-artemiya-k.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
23 “Архиепископу Гродненскому и Волковысскому присуждена учёная степень доктора теологии.” 
Гродненская епархия. Белорусская православная церковь. 
https://www.orthos.org/eparhiya/bishop/speech/2020/08/14/obrashchenie-arhiepiskopa-grodnenskogo-
volkovysskogo-artemiya-k.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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“Don’t allow to be run by renegades. You will be ashamed of what position some of you 
are taking now. And the state will not look at it indifferently.”24 At that time, Lukashenko 
decided to “bring order to the churches” in his country. It is difficult for him to influence 
the Catholic Church, which ranks second in Belarus in the number of adherents. Still, he 
tries to do so, but he managed to “deal” with the Orthodox Church. 
Belarusian Exarch Paul did not belong to the people close to Lukashenko. They 
“kept their distance.” In the end, Paul was not happy that he had been sent to serve in 
Belarus. He felt more comfortable in Russia,25 so he did not mind going back there. 
Why did Paul risk expressing support for the protesters? It should be borne in 
mind that there was some tension between Lukashenko and the Russian politica l 
leadership before and shortly after the presidential election in Belarus in 2020. 
Lukashenko made it clear that the Russian leaders were preparing protests against him, 
and the representatives of Russia’s top political authorities saw that Lukashenko did not 
have adequate support in his country. They could consider a scheme of supporting 
someone of Lukashenko’s pro-Russian rivals. Therefore, Exarch Paul allowed himse lf 
some liberties regarding the Belarusian leader. However, shortly after the election the 
latter managed to reach an agreement with the Russian politicians and enlist their 
support. In this context, the fate of Paul, who resigned on August 25, at the Synod of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, was decided. In his place, the Synod appointed Bishop 
Venyamin (Benjamin),26 who became Metropolitan of Minsk and Zaslavl, as well as the 
head of the Borisov Eparchy. The new exarch turned out to be an acceptable figure for 
Lukashenko.   
 Venyamin (Vitaly Ivanovich Tupeko) is the first non-Russian Belarusian 
exarch. Unlike previous exarchs, he was born, educated, and had a church career in 
Belarus. However, he states that it is easier for him to pray in the Church Slavonic 
language. He also believes that it is not necessary to hurry to translate the service into 
Belarusian. Benjamin firmly defends the “spiritual unity” of Russians, Belarusians, and 
Ukrainians. Accordingly, he believes that they should be united by one religious 
                                                                 
24 А. Вагнер. “ Лукашенко: церкви и костёлы – не для политики.” Белта. 
https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-hramy-kostely-ne-dlja-politiki-403780-2020/.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
25 “Митрополит Минский и Слуцкий Павел: ‘Покидаю Рязань с грустью’.” Правмир. 
https://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-minskij-i-sluckij-pavel-pokidayu-ryazan -s-grustyu/.  Accessed 
15/11/2020. 
26 “Журналы заседания Священного Синода от 25 августа 2020 года.” Русская Православная 
Церковь. Официальный сайт Московского Патриархата. 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5681796.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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structure—the Russian Orthodox Church. He is categorically against the creation of an 
autocephalous Orthodox Church in Belarus and even against the Belarusian Orthodox 
Church gaining more autonomy.27 However, the idea of the Belarusian autocephaly has 
the support of some members of the Belarusian opposition and is spreading among 
protesters. However, the Coordination Council, led by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, 
Lukashenko’s main rival in the presidential election, does not risk raising the issue. 
In his public speeches, Exarch Benjamin makes it clear that when Lukashenko 
was in power in the years previous, there was peace and tranquility in the state. Such 
things should be appreciated. He believes that in the current situation, when the protests 
continue, the position of the church should be neutral.28 At the same time, he meets with 
Lukashenko. Their first known meeting was on October 3, 2020, in the agricultural town 
of Shershuny near Minsk, at the opening and consecration of the Church of St. John the 
Baptist. According to the local mass media, the meeting was held in a warm 
atmosphere.29 
The meeting between Lukashenko and Benjamin, which took place on 
November 2, 2020, is more significant. According to the official information posted on 
the official websites of the President of Belarus30 and the Belarusian Exarchate,31 it was 
held in a spirit of mutual understanding. Lukashenko reiterated his thesis that the 
Orthodox Church was the ideological basis of the Belarusian state, that it should work 
closely with the state, and that the state, in turn, should provide assistance to it. He called 
the exarch a “statesman.” The issue of protests was also touched upon in the 
conversation. Mr. Lukashenko called them non-peaceful and said the protesters were 
violating the public order. At the same time, he threatened that if the activities of any 
organization, including a religious one, were aimed at destroying the state, he would be 
                                                                 
27 “Митрополит Минский и Заславский, Патриарший Єкзарх всея Беларуси Вениамин дал первое 
большое интервью порталу МЛЫН.BU после возведения в сан.” Борисовская епархия. 
http://borisoveparhia.by/intervyu/mitropolit-minskiy-i-zaslavskiy-patr.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
28 “ ‘Позиция церкви должна быть нейтральной’: митрополит Минский и Заславский Вениамин, 
Патриарший экзарх всея Беларуси.” Борисовская епархия. http://borisoveparhia.by/video-
novosti/poziciya-cerkvi-dolzhna-byt-neytral.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
29 Н. Бутович.  “Лукашенко встретился с новым митрополитом Беларуси Вениамином.” 
Комсомольская правда. Беларусь. https://www.kp.by/online/news/4034413/.   Accessed 15/11/2020. 
30 “Встреча с митрополитом Минским и Заславским Вениамином, Патриаршим экзархом всея 
Беларуси.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный Интернет-портал Президента 
Республики Беларусь. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vstrecha-s-mitropolitom-minskim- i-
zaslavskim-veniaminom-patriarshim-ekzarxom-vseja-belarusi-24796/.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
31  “Состоялась встреча митрополита Вениамина с Александром Лукашенко.” Официальній портал 
Белорусской Православной Церкви. http://www.church.by/news/sostojalas-vstrecha-mitropolita-
veniamina-s-aleksandrom-lukashenko. Accessed 15/11/2020.  
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forced to react. In the context of these considerations, he hinted that Catholics (in 
particular their leader in Belarus, Metropolitan of Minsk and Mogilev, Tadevush 
Kandrusevich,)32 are engaged in such activities. In general, during the conversation with 
Benjamin, Lukashenko allowed himself to discuss the attitude of various denominations 
in Belarus to the protests. It looked as if he had gotten a like-minded person. 
Commenting on his meeting with Lukashenko, Benjamin later said: “Every person, a 
citizen of our country, has the right to his/her position, and this is provided by the 
relevant norms and church laws. But at the same time, we must understand when and 
how to express our position.” The Exarch of Belarus specifically stressed that the priest 
should not take actions that would divide “our society.”33 In fact, he made it clear that 
he was positive about Lukashenko and disapproved of the clergy’s support for the 
protests. 
At the very least, it can be concluded that Lukashenko has succeeded in bringing 
the leadership of the Belarusian Orthodox Church to the forefront of his policy. 
However, he failed to do so with the leadership of the Catholic Church. 
 
The Catholic Church in Belarus: Against Government Violence  
The Catholic Church is relatively influential in the country. As of January 1, 
2020, there were 498 Roman Catholic communities in Belarus, which are united in four 
dioceses. There are six theological schools, 11 missions, and nine monasteries. Roman 
Catholic communities had 514 places of worship, and additionally, 31 churches were 
built. Moreover, the Catholic Church in Belarus includes Greek Catholics with 16 
communities.34 Although the number of registered Catholic communities was inferior to 
Protestants, and even to such a Protestant denomination as Christians of the Evangelica l 
faith (which had 524 registered communities), Catholics still have more believers than 
                                                                 
32 “Встреча с митрополитом Минским и Заславским Вениамином, Патриаршим экзархом всея 
Беларуси.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный Интернет-портал Президента 
Республики Беларусь. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vstrecha-s-mitropolitom-minskim- i-
zaslavskim-veniaminom-patriarshim-ekzarxom-vseja-belarusi-24796/ . Accessed 15/11/2020.  
33 “Митрополит Вениамин рассказал о беседе с Лукашенко.” Reformation. https://reform.by/176726-
mitropolit-veniamin-rasskazal-o-besede-s-lukashenko.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
34 “Информация о кофессиональной ситуации в Республике Беларусь.” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/1439296790.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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Protestants. The Catholic leadership in Belarus estimates that there are more than 
1,400,000 Catholics in the country or equate to about 15% of the population.35 
The largest concentration of Roman Catholic communities is in the Grodno 
region where there are 176 communities, i.e., slightly more than a third of the total.36 As 
previously mentioned, this western Belarusian region belongs to the most pro-Western 
regions and is “most oppositional” to Lukashenko’s regime. The Catholic Church in 
Belarus, with its close ties to the Catholic centers of the West, is therefore pro-Western. 
In addition, some of the priests of this church are foreign citizens, in particular, they are 
Polish citizens. Concerning ethnic matters, one can notice a certain pro-Belarusian 
position of this church. In contrast to the Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Belarusian 
language is used relatively widely. In particular, services are conducted in Belarusian 
and Polish. 
All this together distances this church and its believers from the pro-Russian 
Lukashenko’s regime. As a result, a significant portion of the Belarusian Catholic clergy 
supported the protesters. The head of the Roman Catholics in Belarus, Metropolitan of 
Minsk and Mogilev Tadevush Kandrusevich, did not congratulate Lukashenko on his 
victory after the 2020 presidential election. Instead, he called on the authorities and 
protesters to sit down at the negotiating table and appealed to the parties regarding the 
conflict to stop the violence. In his address to the state authorities of the Republic of 
Belarus on August 14, he wrote: “Blood was shed on the streets of our cities, beatings 
of people who went to peaceful demonstrations because they want to know the truth; 
cruel treatment and inhumane conditions in places of imprisonment is a grave sin of 
conscience of those who give criminal orders and commit violence.”37 As it was 
impossible for Lukashenko to reach an agreement with Metropolitan Kandrusevich and 
to remove him from the position of head of the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic 
of Belarus, it was decided to use harsher methods. On August 31, Kandrusevich was not 
allowed to re-enter Belarus from Poland. Lukashenko began saying that the metropolitan 
was going to Warsaw for consultations, and that the Catholic Church was “conducting 
                                                                 
35 “Рыма-каталіцкі Касцёл у Беларусі: статыстычныя даныя на 1 сакавіка 2009 г.” Catholic.bu. 
http://old.catholic.by/2/belarus/dioceses.html.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
36 “Религиозные общины в Республике Беларусь (на 1 января 2020 г.).” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/kolichestvo-
religioznyh-obshhin-v-respublike-belarus-na-1-yanvarya-2019-g.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
37 “Зварот арцыбіскупа Тадэвуша Кандрусевіча да дзяржаўных уладаў Рэспублікі 
Беларусь.”  Catholic.by. https://catholic.by/3/news/belarus/12014-zvarot-artsyb-skupa-tadevusha-
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anti-Lukashenko and anti-state propaganda.”38 At the same time, the authorities began 
to exert various pressures on Catholics, and the security forces even blocked some 
Catholic places of worship. 
Such actions provoked a negative reaction from Catholics. Reacting to the 
discrediting of Metropolitan Kondruchevych by the authorities, Vicar General of the 
Archdiocese of Minsk and Mogilev and Bishop Yuri Kosobutsky declared before the 
solemn Mass on October 28, in the Minsk Cathedral of the Blessed Virgin Mary that the 
current head of the Belarusian Catholics was a symbol of religious pressure and 
persecution in the country. The video of this speech was posted on the official portal of 
the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus.39 Instead, during the aforementioned meeting 
between Lukashenko and Exarch Benjamin on November 2, the Belarusian leader said 
that Kondruchevych “went to Poland and received advice on how to destroy the 
country.”40 
Following this statement, the Belarusian Catholics began collecting signatures in 
an open appeal to the authorities demanding an end to the political persecution of 
Metropolitan Kondruchevych.41 However, the authorities did not pay much attention to 
such things, resorting to intimidation and repressive actions. 
 
Protestants, Jews, Old Believers, Muslims, and Other Denominations in Belarus: 
Between Loyalty and Protests 
In addition to Orthodox and Catholics, Belarus has a relatively large number of 
other religious communities: 1,038 of Protestants, 53 of Jews, 34 of Old Believers, and 
                                                                 
38 “Посещение Барановичского государственного профессионально -технического колледжа сферы 
обслуживания.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный Интернет-портал Президента 
Республики Беларусь. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poseschenie-baranovichskogo-
gosudarstvennogo-professionalno-texnicheskogo-kolledzha-sfery-obsluzhivanija-24442/.  Accessed 
15/11/2020. 
39 “Епископ Кособуцкий: митрополит Кондрусевич  является символом давления и преследования 
человека в Беларуси.”  Naviny.bu.  https://naviny.media/new/20201029/1603966054-ep iskop -
kosobuckiy-mitropolit-kondrusevich-yavlyaetsya-simvolom-davleniya-i.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
40 “Встреча с митрополитом Минским и Заславским Вениамином, Патриаршим экзархом всея 
Беларуси.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный Интернет-портал Президента 
Республики Беларусь. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vstrecha-s-mitropolitom-minskim- i-
zaslavskim-veniaminom-patriarshim-ekzarxom-vseja-belarusi-24796/.  Accessed 15/11/2020. 
41 “ ‘Митрополит Тадеуш — бесспорный моральный авторитет для верующих.’ Католики требуют 
прекратить преследование архипастыря.” Naviny.bu. 
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OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2020) XL, 10 39
34 of Muslims. There are also a number of other small religious organizations. 42 
However, they do not have a large number of believers and do not enjoy a significant 
influence in the Belarusian society. Under the authoritarian regime of Lukashenko, these 
organizations usually try to take a position that would suit the government so as not to 
run into trouble. In the current situation, when mass protests are taking place in the 
country, they often take a neutral position. 
Thus, the Mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of 
Belarus published an appeal about these events, which was generally neutral. It said: 
“Muslim men and women oppose violence in all its forms, regardless of who the 
violence comes from, and ask the Almighty to stop all violence in our country.”43 This 
position generally suits Lukashenko. Therefore, at the mentioned meeting with Exarch 
Benjamin on November 2, he stated: “Muslims have never created problems for us. I 
often say that Muslims supported the government and me as president almost 100% in 
all elections.”44 
As for Protestants, in particular their leaders, they also usually try to take a 
neutral position and are not marked by public activism. In this regard, the Orthodox 
priest Alexander Shramko, who actually became one of the organizers of prayers and 
processions in Minsk in support of the protesters, notes the following: “In general, 
Protestants are a diverse community, there are many different directions, and each 
community is, in fact, autonomous. There are appeals from evangelical Christians, and 
Pentecostals; the Baptists have no common position because there is no agreement. In 
our country, Protestants try to stay away from political issues in order to maintain the 
status quo.” Although Shramko also stated that some Protestants, pastors and ordinary 
believers, one way or another support the protests in Belarus.45 
 There is no consensus among the Protestant organizations in Belarus on the 
assessment of the current political situation in the country. Some of them support 
                                                                 
42 “Информация о кофессиональной ситуации в Республике Беларусь.” Уполномоченный по делам 
религии и национальностей Республики Беларусь. https://belarus21.by/Articles/1439296790.  
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
43 “Заявление муфтията Духовного управления Республики Беларусь.”  Іslam.by. 
https://islam.by/post/zayavlenie-muftiyata-dukhovnogo-upravleniya-musulman-v-respublike-belarus. 
Accessed 15/11/2020. 
44 “Встреча с митрополитом Минским и Заславским Вениамином, Патриаршим экзархом всея 
Беларуси.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный Интернет-портал Президента 
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45 О. Вагнер. “ ‘Власть показала сатанинское лицо.’ Церковь и белорусские протесты.” Радио 
Свобода. https://www.svoboda.org/a/30792357.html. Accessed 15/11/2020. 
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Lukashenko’s regime, arguing that all power is from God. They claim that under 
Lukashenko, Belarus developed as a peaceful country and there was no moral decline as 
in the West (same-sex marriage, gender equality, juvenile justice). That is why 
Lukashenko is seen as a “lesser evil” than the liberal democracies of the West. Yet some 
Protestants and some of their pastors oppose the violence perpetrated by the authorit ies. 
Thus, on August 20, several dozen pastors of Protestant communities addressed the 
people of Belarus, which gave a negative assessment of the actions of the authorities and 
declared support for the protesters.46 
Despite the often-neutral position of the leadership of various religious 
organizations, their believers take an active part in the protests. Thus, the detention of 
the Old Believers, Herman and Natalia Snezhkov in Gomel for participating in protests 
and “opposing the authorities” became resonant. A statement was made by the World 
Union of Old Believers on October 1, 2020,47 and only after that the detainees were 
released. 
Representatives of various denominations both large (Orthodox, Catholic) and 
small (Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Old Believers, etc.), take part in joint prayers, where 
calls are made to the authorities to stop the violence. In particular, such actions became 
widespread in Minsk and Grodno. 
 
Conclusions 
The events that took place in Belarus from August to November 2020 that were 
related to the presidential election, in one way or another, affected the religious 
organizations of Belarus. The leaders of these organizations had to determine whether 
they supported the current government, Lukashenko’s regime, or the protesters. The 
leadership of the largest religious organization in Belarus, the Belarusian Orthodox 
Church, initially expressed some dissatisfaction with the authorities’ violence. However, 
after the change of the head of this church, which took place on August 25, 2020, the 
                                                                 
46 “Открытое Обращение Евангельских Протестантских Церквей К Народу Беларуси.” 
Baznica.info. http://baznica.info/2020/08/otkrytoe-obrashhenie-evangelskix-protestantskix-cerkvej- k-
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situation changed. The new Exarch of Belarus, Benjamin, generally showed a positive 
attitude towards Lukashenko’s regime, although many Orthodox and clerics supporte d 
the protesters. Instead, the leadership of the Catholic Church condemned the acts of 
violence of the Belarusian authorities, which is why the authorities are putting pressure 
on this church. As for the religious organizations that do not have much influence in the 
Belarusian society (Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Old Believers, etc.), their leaders often 
try to distance themselves from political issues without explicitly supporting either side.  
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“ ‘Позиция церкви должна быть нейтральной’: митрополит Минский и Заславский 
Вениамин, Патриарший экзарх всея Беларуси.” Борисовская епархия. 
http://borisoveparhia.by/video-novosti/poziciya-cerkvi-dolzhna-byt-neytral.html. 
 
“Посещение Барановичского государственного профессионально-технического 
колледжа сферы обслуживания.” Президент Республики Беларусь. Официальный 




“Почти половина населения Белоруссии – верующие.” NEWSru. 
https://www.newsru.com/religy/09jul2001/verobel.html. 
 
“Предстоятель Белорусской церкви извинился за поздравление Лукашенко с 
победой.” Радио Свобода. https://www.svoboda.org/a/30784028.html. 
 
“Состоялась встреча митрополита Вениамина с Александром Лукашенко.” 




“Религиозные общины в Республике Беларусь (на 1 января 2020 г.)” Уполномоченный 




“Рыма-каталіцкі Касцёл у Беларусі: статыстычныя даныя на 1 сакавіка 2009 г.” 
Catholic.bu. http://old.catholic.by/2/belarus/dioceses.html. 
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